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1. Introduction 
This study models interstate banking in the United States to ascertain significant contributing factors. Interstate banking in the U.S. refers to banking 
firms operating across state lines. It constitutes an import-
ant component of banking deregulation since the 1970s 
when major banking firms demanded more flexibility in 
choosing geographical locations for their businesses. In-
terstate banking is highly geographical since it involves 
banking networks spreading across space connecting vari-
ous home states with host states. Modeling such networks 
allows an understanding of factors that contribute to and 
shape the spatial organization of banking. However, the 
accuracy in modeling interstate banking depends upon the 
approach adopted. In addition to data accuracy and model 
specification, other factors also contribute to the estima-
tion accuracy. First, there is possible spatial dependence 
where certain geographical structures exist in interstate 
banking. There is also an issue of modeling “outward” vs. 
“inward” interstate banking. Outward interstate banking 
refers to banking firms going out of their own home states 
to operate in host states while inward interstate banking 
means host states receiving banking branches from out-
of-state banking firms. These are different banking be-
haviors and both need to be accounted for. In addition, 
outward and inward interstate banking of the same states 
may interact with each other. For example, a strong out-
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ward interstate banking state with major banking firms 
may deter banking firms from other states to make ac-
quisitions. Finally, there is the temporal factor where the 
earlier spatial pattern may affect the later pattern. An ideal 
modeling approach should take all these factors (spatial 
dependence, outward and inward, interaction between 
outward and inward, and temporal effects) into account. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate interstate banking 
taking all four factors into consideration, using a spatial 
3-stage least squares model (spatial 3SLS). In this ap-
proach, outward and inward interstate banking regression 
equations are included for different temporal points. All 
regression equations contain a spatial autoregressive term 
of the dependent variable as an endogenous explanatory 
variable (also known as the spatial lag) and a spatially 
autoregressive error term (also known as the spatial error) 
[2]. The regression equations in the system are estimated 
simultaneously to account for spatial dependence, and the 
contemporaneous correlation between outward and in-
ward interstate banking, and between interstate banking of 
different temporal points.  
2. Interstate Banking in the United States
During the 19th century, the U.S. banking industry devel-
oped geographical fragmentation due to divergent polit-
ical and economic interests that existed between cities 
and rural areas, and between large money center banks 
headquartered in New York, Chicago, etc. and small com-
munity banks [9]. The geographical fragmentation was 
manifested in the limitations on branch banking, and later 
on in multi-bank holding companies which hold multiple 
banks in different locations. The multi-bank holding com-
panies were developed as a way to get around branching 
limitations before they were prohibited [17]. Although in-
dustrialization and urbanization prompted some states to 
loosen such limitations to various extent (e.g. California 
and New York), the regulatory restrictions remained in 
many states until in the late 20th century, especially in ag-
ricultural states.
Geographical deregulation in banking came as a result 
of searching for solutions to the disintermediation in the 
1970s and banking crisis during the 1980s [32].  Intra-state 
branching and interstate bank holding were the two main 
venues. Many states which previously prohibited or lim-
ited in-state branching now loosened or ended the limita-
tion.  Many states also passed laws allowing out-of-state 
banking firms to enter their states, some on the reciprocal 
basis. Banking geographical deregulation culminated in 
1994 with the passage of the federal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) which authorizes 
nationwide banking and branching opening a new era in 
the U.S. banking history. 
Twenty years on, the IBBEA facilitated tremendous in-
terstate banking consolidation. Figure 1 shows the number 
of interstate banking mergers and acquisitions based on 
the Federal Reserve Bank Merger data (bars in the figure). 
The numbers of interstate consolidations in Figure 1 ex-
clude the mergers of institutions that were already operat-
ing under the same bank holding companies. During the 
1980s, interstate banking mergers and acquisitions were 
numbered only 16 on average every year, including in-
terstate rescues of failed institutions permitted by federal 
laws. During the 1990s, the annual average of interstate 
mergers and acquisitions rose to 96. In 1998, there was 
a record 183 deals of interstate banking consolidation. 
Although the number of interstate consolidations declined 
since then, there were still 100 deals per year on average 
between 1999 and 2005. These numbers are largely con-
sistent with estimates from Jones and Critchfield [16] and 
DeYoung et al [10] whose research shows a peak in con-
solidation values around 1998. Adams [1] estimates that 
between 2000 and 2010, of the largest 30 bank merger 
and acquisition deals in the United States, 19 were inter-
state consolidations. The 2007/8 financial crisis triggered 
another wave of interstate banking mergers and consolida-
tions as many weakened banking institutions entered the 
voluntary mergers [21]. 
Interstate banking consolidations have significantly 
altered the geography of banking in the United States. For 
example, in 1994, out of 10,328 independent domestic 
banking institutions (bank holding companies, indepen-
dent commercial banks and saving institutions), 353 or 
3.4% were engaged in interstate banking. Twenty percent 
of the total deposits and offices in the country was held 
across state lines (deposits and offices located in host 
states were owned by out-of-state banking firms). In 2014, 
banking consolidation had led to a reduction of the num-
ber of domestic banking institutions to 6147. There were 
692 banking institutions or 11.2% of the total in 2014 
which participated in interstate banking, holding 46% of 
deposits and 41% of bank offices across state lines.  Using 
state centroids to measure interstate distance, the average 
distance between home and host states in interstate bank-
ing was 623 miles in 1994. When using deposits and of-
fices as weights, the weighted interstate banking distance 
was 676 miles (deposits as weights) or 596 miles (offices as 
weights).  In 2014, the average interstate banking distance 
rose to 773 miles with the weighted distance at 1100 miles 
(deposits as weights) or 895 miles (offices as weights). 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of deposits and offices held 
across state lines by distance range. In 1994, over half 
of the deposits and offices involved in interstate banking 
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were held within 500 miles. In 2014, both percentages 
dropped below 50%. At the same time, percentages of de-
posits and offices held in longer distances consistently in-
creased in 2014 than in 1994 with the exception of offices 
held at the 1500 to 2000 miles range.    
Maps in Figure 3 confirm significant changes in the 
geography of interstate banking between 1994 and 2014. 
Figures 3a and 3b show deposits held in other states as 
a percent of total deposits of a state in 1994 and 2014, 
respectively, a measure of a state’s outward interstate 
banking (i.e. owning banking facilities in other states). In 
contrast, Figures 3c and 3d display deposits held by other 
states as a percent of total deposits of a state in 1994 and 
2014, respectively, a measure of a state’s inward interstate 
banking (that is, deposits owned by other states). Clearly, 
during the 20 year span from 1994 to 2014, more states 
had become involved in outward and inward interstate 
banking, and in general at increasing magnitudes (rising 
percentages of deposits held in or by other states). A care-
ful examination of the maps shows that inward interstate 
banking is much more common than outward interstate 
banking. While most states saw their shares of deposits 
held by other states increased, only a selective number of 
states emerged owning significantly higher shares of de-
posits in other states. These differential patterns motivate 
this study which aims to ascertain contributing factors of 
the outward interstate banking and inward interstate bank-
ing, respectively. 
3. Method 
The traditional banking modeling mostly uses the single 
equation method [4,15,24,27]. Using a single equation model, 
outward interstate banking and inward interstate banking 
would have to be estimated in separate regression models. 
The above maps suggest shortcomings of the single equa-
tion approach. For example, Figures 3b and 3d show that 
in 2014, major outward interstate banking states, such as 
California, North Caroline, New York, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, Georgia, and Alabama had higher percentages of de-
posits held in other states but lower percentages of deposit 
held by other states. In contrast, many states with higher 
percentages deposits held by other states have lower per-
centages of deposits held in other states. This suggests 
that outward and inward interstate banking equations are 
not independent of each other and there may be possible 
inter-equation correlation. Taking the inter-equation cor-
relation into account may help improve the efficiency of 
estimation. 
In addition, some early patterns in interstate banking 
persisted to later time. For example, some Western states 
and states in the Southeast were major inward interstate 
banking states in 1994 (Figure 3c). In 2014, these states 
were still among those with higher percentages of inward 
interstate banking (Figure 3d). The persistence in outward 
interstate banking is less prominent than in inward inter-
state banking. Still, one can recognize states such as North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Minnesota which continued to be ma-
jor outward interstate banking states from 1994 to 2014. 
Such temporal persistence suggests possible inter-equation 
correlation in models where different equations contain 
models of different years. 
In addition to temporal persistence, the prominent po-
sition in inward interstate banking of Western states also 
suggests possible spatial dependence. Indeed, there are 
reasons to believe certain spatial structure in interstate 
banking. Historically, Western states tended to have more 
liberal banking laws compared with the Midwestern 
states, contributing to higher inward interstate banking 
in the West than in the Midwest. During the 1980s, there 
were regional interstate banking compacts where neigh-
boring states agreed to allow each other’s banks to enter 
respective markets [25,33]. In general space seems to act in 
a powerful way to shape interstate banking. Figures 2a 
and 2b show significant distance decay, though weak-
ened somewhat from 1994 to 2014, suggesting spatially 
close states are more likely to enter interstate banking re-
lationships. The distance decay may catch other various 
spatial factors which influence banking but are not easy 
to capture explicitly in regressions. These factors include 
costs, information, and preferences associated with dis-
tance in banking.  The above discussion highlights the 
significance of a method which simultaneously account 
for spatial dependence, outward and inward interstate 
banking and their interaction, and the temporal effects. 
This motivates the adoption of the spatial 3SLS as a 
modeling approach. 
Zellner [38] proposes the seemingly unrelated regression 
or SUR in a multi-equation system to account for con-
temporaneous covariance in the errors between different 
equations. Suppose a single cross-section regression in an 
M equation system as follows
y X u i Mi i i i= + =β 1,2,...  (1)
where y y y yi i i in= ( , ... )1 2 ′  is a n×1 vector containing 
observations of a dependent variable in equation i; Xi an 
n×k matrix containing n observations for k independent 
variables in equation i; βi=(βi1,βi2,...βik)' a k×1 vector of k 
regression coefficients in equation i; and ui=(ui1,ui2,...uik)' 
a vector of n errors in equation i.  In Zellner’s original 
work, the simultaneous system is estimated by using the 
(feasible) Generalized Least Square estimator 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v2i3.1375
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βGLS
^ 1 1= Ω Ω = ⊗ ⊗(X X X y X I X X I y′ ′ ′ ′− −)−1 ( ) ( (∑ ∑− −1 1) )−1 ( ( ) )
 (2)
in which Ω=Σ ⊗  I where Σ is an M×M matrix of 
variance-covariance of the M equations in the system. I 
is an N×N identity matrix. The Kronecker product oper-
ator ⊗  multiplies every element in Σ by I, leading to a 
(M·N)×(M·N) variance-covariance matrix Ω for the entire 
M equation system.  The GLS estimator incorporates the 
inter-equation covariance and thus increases the estima-
tion efficiency, with the efficiency gains rising with in-
creasing inter-equation covariance [12]. 
In standard SUR, each equation by itself is a classical 
regression. Thus each equation’s variance-covariance 
matrix is σiiI with 0 in the off principal diagonal. When 
spatial effects exist, the following relationships replace 
equation (1) in an M equation system
yi=ρiWyi+Xiβi+ui 
ui=λiWui+εi (3)
where W is a weight matrix that defines the spatial 
autocorrelation structure; 𝜌i the spatial autoregressive 
parameter for the spatial lag variable in equation I; λi the 
autoregressive parameter for spatial error; and εi a spher-
ical error term. Other terms are defined as before. Lee [22] 
shows that the variance-covariance of any single equation 
i is ∑i=σii(I-λiW)
-1(I-λiW
')-1 The off principal diagonal 
elements are not necessarily zero and errors are spatially 
correlated. In addition, the endogenous explanatory vari-
able Wyi and error terms are correlated 
[20]. All these make 
Zellner’s OLS-based estimator biased and inconsistent [2]. 
Kelejian et al. [20] and Anselin et al. [3] show a spatial 
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, which uses filtered vari-
ables to remove the spatial dependence from the error 
term in (3). That is, 
(I−λiW)yi=(I−λiW)Ziδi+(I−λiW)ui (4)
where Zi=[Xi, Wyi] and δi=[βi',ρi]'
Define filtered variables ysi=(I−λiW)yi and Zsi=(I−λiW)
Ziδi  (5)
Thus (4) becomes ysi=Zsiδi+εi (6)
In both (4) and (6), the endogenous variable Wyi is 
correlated with the error term [22]. As a result, 2-stage least 
squares (2SLS) is needed in estimation in which instru-
mental variables are used to generate residuals uncorrelat-
ed with the endogenous variable [36]. 
In the spatial regression system, parameters to be esti-
mated include λi, ρi and βi. Operationally, this can be done 
in three steps [3,20]. In the first step, a 2SLS is applied to 
estimate (3). Instrumental variables H=[X, WX] are used 
to instrument Wyi (first stage) and then use the resultant 
H(H'H)−1H'Z to instrument yi (second stage) to obtain ini-
tial estimates of ρi and βi 
[22]. In the second step, residuals 
from the first step are used to estimate λi and the variance 
of the errors, by solving a three moment-equation system 
from the moment conditions, or the General Method of 
Moments (GMM) suggested by Kelejian and Prucha [19]. 
Anselin [3] gives a detailed description of implementation 
of the GMM. In the third step, λi from the second step is 
used to create filtered variables as in (5) and the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares estimator is applied to (6) in a 
spatial SUR to obtain revised ρi and βi. The Feasible Gen-
eralized Least Squares estimator is   
β^FGLS=(Zs'Ω
−1^Zs)
−1(Zs'Ω
−1^ys)=(Zs'(Σ
−1^ ⊗ I)
Zs)
−1(Zs'(Σ
−1^ ⊗ I)ys) (7)
where Zs and ys are filtered variables, Ω
^=Σ^ ⊗ I, and 
Σ^ is the estimate of Σ from the sample. The last step is 
essentially a 3-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) [2,14] in which 
a 2SLS is first performed on each single equation as in 
(6) of the equation system. The instrumental variables 
can still be those used in the first step as discussed above. 
However, Lee [22] suggests the use of the filtered instru-
mental variables, which is adopted in this study. Residuals 
from the 2SLS are then used to estimate between-equation 
correlations to obtain Σ^. Finally, estimator (7) is used to 
estimate the system of equations. 
4. The Estimating Model, Variables and Data
In actual estimation, the method discussed above is ap-
plied to a panel data set. Equation (3) is adopted for all 50 
states in the United States plus the District of Columbia. 
These are home and host states in the interstate banking 
networks. In addition, these are regulatory units regulating 
branch banking and multi-location bank holding histori-
cally, and to a certain degree, regulating interstate banking 
today (see below). For each state plus DC, outward and 
inward interstate banking equations are specified for both 
1994 and 2014. Thus the following four estimating equa-
tions are included in the spatial 3SLS system.   
yout1994=ρout 1994Wyout 1994+Xout 1994βout 1994+(I−λout 1994W)
−1εout 
1994
yout 2014=ρout 2014Wyout 2014+Xout 2014βout 2014+(I−λout 2014W)
−1εout 
2014
yin 1994=ρin 1994Wyin 1994+Xin 1994βin 1994+(I−λin 1994W)
−1εin 1994
yin 2014=ρin 2014Wyin 2014+Xin 2014βin 2014+(I−λin 2014W)
−1εin 2014
 (8)
yout is a 51×1 matrix of dependent variable, outward 
interstate banking, defined separately for 1994 and 2014. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v2i3.1375
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Similarly yin is a 51×1 matrix of dependent variable, in-
ward interstate banking, defined separately for 1994 and 
2014. X is a 51×k matrix of independent variables. In 
operation, for each year, the same k independent variable 
are entered for both yout and yin regressions. However, 
each equation may end up having a different or overlap-
ping combination of statistically significant variables from 
the k independent variables entered. I is a 51×51 identity 
matrix. W is the weights matrix that defines the pattern of 
spatial dependence. The Queen contiguity specification is 
adopted for the weights in this study. ε are errors of each 
equation. Parameters to be estimated are ρ, λ, and βs for 
each equations. It should be noted that due to the use of 
the Queen contiguity weights, Alaska and Hawaii are ac-
tually dropped out of the simultaneous system since these 
two states are not physically adjacent to any other states. 
They would be retained within the system with the use of 
alternative weights matrixes (such as distance-based or 
socioeconomic relationship-based matrices).  
4.1 Dependent Variables
Table 1 contains brief definitions of dependent variables, 
democratic and socioeconomic intendent variables, 
banking intendent variables and banking legislative in-
dependent variables. Outbanking, or outward interstate 
banking, is defined as the deposits owned by a state (home 
state) but located in other states (host states) divided by 
the total deposits of the home state and measured as a 
percentage. Inbanking or inward interstate banking is the 
deposits located within a state (host state) but owned by 
other states (home states) divided by the total deposits of 
the host state, measured as a percentage. Outbanking and 
Inbanking measure the extent to which a state engages in 
outward and inward interstate banking, respectively.
4.2 Demographic/Socioeconomic Independent 
Variables
Demographic and socioeconomic variables are included 
to capture possible impacts from income, market size, 
and economic structure which essentially translate to de-
mands for banking [6,13,28]. The percent of urban population 
(UrbanPop) and per capita income (PCI) measure states’ 
general economic wellbeing and development. The total 
state employment or Employees is a proxy of the market 
size of a state, avoiding using the same aggregates (pop-
ulation, total deposits, total income, etc.) that are used in 
creating other variables. Location quotients are calculated 
using employment data to characterize states’ economic 
structures. The location quotient is the ratio of a state’s 
percent of employment in an industry to the percent of the 
U.S. employment in that industry. A high location quotient 
above 1 means a strong specialization in that industry, 
and a small value below 1 means a lack of specialization. 
The location quotients used in the study include primary 
(LQPrimay), service (LQService), manufacturing (LQM-
FG), FIRE (LQFIRE), and government (LQGov) sectors. 
Due to changes in industrial classification in 1997, loca-
tion quotients for 1998 were calculated as a proxy of the 
economic structure of 1994. PopChange, or the average 
annual population change rate in a 10 year interval, is de-
signed to reflect the changing market size (More in Sub-
section 4.3 on how the 10 year interval is determined).   
4.3 Banking Independent Variables
FirmSize is the average size of a state’s banking firms 
involved in interstate banking, calculated as the total de-
posits of these firms divided by the number of these firms. 
PCO or the average number of bank offices per 1000 peo-
ple in a state measures the banking service availability, 
though online banking may have made such a measure 
less relevant. It turns out that PCO is not statistically sig-
nificant in any of the four equations in the system. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI measures the level of 
concentration of a state’s banking industry. The HHI is the 
sum of the squared deposit market shares of banking firms 
in a state and ranges between close to 0 and 10000. Higher 
HHI values indicate higher levels of concentration which 
is associated with less competitive markets. ROEChange 
is used to capture the profitability of a state’s banking 
industry. It is the average rate of return on equity for a 
state’s banking industry in a 10 year interval.  KalaChange 
is the average capital-to-labor ratio for a 10 year interval 
for a state’s banking industry. The capital-to-labor ratio 
is the ratio of bank expenses on premises/physical capital 
to expenses on labor. LaborChange is the average percent 
of expenses on labor in the total non-interest expenses for 
a state’s banking industry, calculated for a 10 year inter-
val. Together, KalaChange and LaborChange may help 
capture the use of technology in banking as reflected in 
capital expenses. Since the two anchor years of the study 
are 1994 and 2014, the 10 year interval is taken as the 10 
years prior to the two anchor years. That is, from 1984 to 
1994, and 2004 to 2014 respectively. 
4.4 Banking Legislative Independent Variables
Bklaw is a composite index adding up scores assigned to 
state banking laws concerning geographical restrictions 
on banking. Two sets of banking laws are used, intra-state 
branch banking and interstate banking. Within each law 
category, the 1985 statute and the 1992 statute are used to 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v2i3.1375
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reflect the changing state banking laws from the 1980s up 
to the eve of the IBBEA in 1994. In terms of intra-state 
branching, various state laws permit statewide (3 points 
assigned), limited (2 points), or no branching (1 point). 
In terms of interstate banking, various state laws allow 
nationwide (4 points assigned), nationwide reciprocal (3 
points), regionwide reciprocal (3 points), regionwide re-
ciprocal when the state law takes effect (2 points), or no 
interstate banking (1 point). A few states had no interstate 
banking law in 1985 and/or 1992. They are assigned 1.5 
points since they did not explicitly permit or prohibit it. 
The assigned value rises with increasing permissibility in 
the respective law. Each state’s score in Bklaw is the sum 
of assigned values in both intra-state branch banking and 
interstate banking laws/regulations. 
While Bklaw reflects the state banking laws prior to 
the nationwide interstate banking, Stbklaw is a composite 
measure designed by Johnson and Rice [15] to index limita-
tions to interstate banking by states since the nationwide 
interstate banking in 1994. The IBBEA expressly allows 
states to restrict the manner by which the out-of-state 
banking firms enter a host state market in four ways. Host 
states can set the minimum age of the target institution in 
acquisition by out-of-state banking firms up to five years; 
host states can decide whether establishment of de novo 
branches is permitted by out-of-state banking firms; host 
states can decide whether out-of-state banking firms can 
acquire an existing office of a bank, instead of acquiring 
the entire bank; and host states can establish a deposit cap 
to restrict the size of an out-of-state banking firm under a 
certain percentage of the total deposits in a state, such as 
no more than 30% [15].  For each limitation, Johnson and 
Rice give one point if a certain limitation is applied or 0 
otherwise. That is, one point is assigned for each of the 
following limitations: a minimum of 3 years or more is re-
quired for the interstate acquisition target institution; a de 
novo branching is not permitted; acquisition of a branch is 
not permitted; and a deposit cap less than 30% is imposed 
[15,31]. Stbklaw ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values indi-
cating more restrictions on interstate banking.            
Following Zhou and Kockelman [39], all explanatory 
variables are entered four equations individually. A step-
wise regression procedure is applied to retain statistically 
significant variables. These variables are used in the three 
steps in the estimation process, as discussed in Section 3.   
Income, population, and employment data are obtained 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis Internet sites. Urban population is from 
the Bureau of Census. All banking data are from the Fed-
eral Deposits Insurance Corporation Internet sites. The 
banking institutions include bank holding companies and 
independent banking institutions including commercial 
banks, state banks, saving banks, and saving and loans in-
stitutions which receive the depositary insurance from the 
FDIC.  Thus it has the widest possible coverage of bank-
ing institutions in the United States.  
5. Results
In estimating the four equation system, linear restrictions 
are applied to ρ and λ to restrict their values to be 0. The 
result is compared with the unrestricted model in order to 
test the statistical significance of spatial effects. The fol-
lowing F test is used following Greene [12] and Henningsen 
and Hamann [14]. 
F =
ESS M N k
(ESS ESS j
/
*
(
−
× −
) /
)
 (9)
where ESS* and ESS are sums of squares of residuals 
for restricted and unrestricted models respectively; j is the 
number of linear restrictions, k the number of explanatory 
variables, N the number of observations in each equa-
tion, and M the number of equations. The F test has j and 
M×N-k degrees of freedom respectively. The resultant F 
value is 3.6 and the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.01 
level. Thus the spatial effects are present in the interstate 
banking system as a whole.  
Table 2 provides between-question contemporaneous 
correlations. They show that in 2014, there was only slight 
contemporaneous correlation in residuals (-0.07) between 
Outbanking and Inbanking. However, this was not the 
case in 1994 when the contemporaneous correlation in 
residuals between Outbanking and Inbanking was much 
stronger at 0.22. In terms of temporal correlation, residu-
als in Outbanking during the earlier period informed later 
period (0.19) more than in Inbanking (-0.11).  Incorporat-
ing these correlations in estimation has moderately signifi-
cant impacts on the results. Of the 46 parameter estimates, 
twelve or 25% experience a change in the magnitude at or 
above 10% after incorporating the between-equation con-
temporaneous correlations. 
Table 3 provides the final estimation result of the 
four-equation system. Since the expected signs for all pa-
rameters are either positive or negative for the alternative 
hypothesis, the table gives one-tailed p-values. The dis-
cussion below will focus on the roles of spatial variables, 
demographic/socioeconomic variables, banking variables, 
and banking legislative variables. 
5.1 Spatial Lags and Spatial Errors
The spatial lag is statistically significant with a positive sign 
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in the Inbanking equations of both years. This indicates a 
positive spatial autocorrelation in inward interstate bank-
ing where a state’s position in inward interstate banking is 
positively associated with their neighboring states. In other 
words, states with similar levels of Inbanking tended to 
cluster, as seen in Figures 3c and 3d where the West in 1994 
and the West and Southwest in 2014 had many higher in-
ward interstate states, and the central portion of the country 
had many moderate inward interstate banking states in both 
years. The positive spatial autocorrelation is closely related 
to the distance decay as shown in Figures 2a and 2b. In 
banking, the need to obtain information, control costs, and 
understand markets still generally favor closer locations [8]. 
Another contributing factor may be the lingering effects of 
the regional patterns of geographical restrictions on banking 
(e.g. the restrictive Midwest vs. the permissive West) and 
the regional banking compacts. Indeed, analyzing the desti-
nations of interstate banking acquisitions between 1988 and 
1993, McLaughlin [23] finds that most expansions occurred 
in neighboring states, rather than non-contiguous states.  On 
the other hand, the spatial lag is not statistically significant 
for the Outbanking equations of both years. In Figures 3a 
and 3b, states with higher Outbanking did not demonstrate 
clear concentration. This indicates that whether states rose 
as significant outward interstate banking players is not nec-
essarily associated with their neighboring states’ outward 
interstate banking status. It is likely that the actions and 
business strategies of banking firms (especially the large 
banking firms as discussed in Sub-section 5.3) within the 
states play significant roles. The spatial effects in the error 
term reflect factors which are not explicitly incorporated as 
explanatory variables in the model. Though magnitude var-
ies, all equations show a negative impacts between neigh-
boring states. 
5.2 Demographic/Socioeconomic Variables
UrbanPop is significant for the 2014 Outbanking equation 
with a negative sign, indicating active outward interstate 
banking states are not confined to those with the highest 
percent of urban population. Indeed, in 2014, of the states 
with the highest Outbanking scores, only New York and 
California were among the top 10 states with the highest 
UrbanPop. Regional interstate banking center power-
houses such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, Minnesota, 
Georgia, and Virginia ranked 14, 18, 26, 27, 28, and 30 in 
terms of UrbanPop. North Carolina, one of the three na-
tional outward interstate banking states, along with New 
York and California, ranked 29 in UrbanPop. While the 
last 20 years have seen significant banking consolidation, 
the U.S. banking industry as whole is still less concentrat-
ed than many other advanced economies. As stated early, 
by 2014 there were still over 6,000 independent banking 
institutions with nearly 700 of them engaged in interstate 
banking. Interstate banking activities from a vast number 
of banking institutions allowed strong outward interstate 
banking states to emerge in their respective regional con-
texts even though these states did not reach the highest 
level of urbanization at the national level. For example, 
as strong regional outward interstate banking states, Al-
abama and Minnesota ranked 26 and 27 respectively in 
UrbanPop nationwide but ranked 1 in their respective East 
South Central Region and North West Central Region. 
The correlation coefficient between Outbanking and the 
percentage of deposits held by top 20 outward interstate 
banking states as host states’ deposit total is -0.24% 
(p-value = 0.04). At the same time, the correlation coeffi-
cient between Outbanking and the percentage of deposits 
held by home state banks as the state deposit total is 0.35% 
(p-value = 0.006). These relationships seem to suggest 
that while major outward interstate banking states tended 
to hold more of deposits in their own states, they tended to 
hold less deposits in other major interstate banking states. 
In other words, major interstate banking firms appear to 
be avoiding competition against each other on their own 
home turf. This finding is consistent with studies which 
suggest that due to the common ultimate ownership by 
fund managers and cross-ownerships (banks hold each 
other’s stocks), there is little competition among some of 
the largest banks [5,34].  In the context of interstate banking, 
the net effect is that major regional outward banking states 
are shielded from an out-right onslaught by the largest 
banking centers in the country. 
Employees, as a measure of market size, was signifi-
cant in 1994 Outbanking with a negative sign suggesting 
that smaller states may actually be active centers of out-
ward interstate banking. This may be due to the fact that in 
1994, there had not been states with nationwide interstate 
banking connections (California banking firms operated 
in 25 other states, compared with 43 in 2014, the high-
est of all states in both years). Active outward interstate 
banking states include large states (e.g.  California, Ohio, 
and North Carolina) as well as many smaller states (e.g. 
Rhode Island, North Dakota, Idaho, Connecticut, Oregon, 
Utah and Nebraska). The uneven state banking legislation 
by the early 1990s had allowed some small states to rise 
to prominence in outward regional interstate banking. 
However, by 2014, the prominence of the smaller states in 
Outbanking all but disappeared. Employees has a positive 
sign for the sample 2014 Outbanking equation, though it 
is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
While Employees measures the market size per se, 
PopChange, or the average population growth rate in a 10 
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year interval, measures the change in the market size. The 
variable is significant for Inbanking equations with a posi-
tive sign in both 1994 and 2014, indicating that the rapidly 
growing markets were more likely to be the target of in-
ward interstate activities. This result is in line with Gunther 
[13] who finds rising population leads to banking expansion.  
Location quotients for manufacturing, FIRE, and gov-
ernment sectors are significant for Outbanking 2014 with 
a positive sign, indicating states with healthy economic 
structures tended to be actively engaged in outward inter-
state banking. In the 2014 Inbanking equation, location 
quotients for primary, manufacturing and FIRE sectors 
are significant with a positive sign, and location quotient 
for service is significant with a negative sign. The sig-
nificant Primary sector may reflect the role of booming 
commodities sectors, especially in energy, in recent years. 
In addition, PCI is significant with a negative sign. Taken 
together, this seems to suggest that states with lower in-
come but strong primary, manufacturing, and FIRE, and 
weak traditional service sector, tended to received much 
inward interstate banking. These results point to the role 
of broader economy in interstate banking: a strong state 
economy may bolster banking firms with an expansion 
ambition across state lines while states with healthy eco-
nomic structures but lower income levels may attract 
inward interstate banking. Interestingly, location quotients 
for service and government sectors are significant for 
1994 Inbanking with a positive sign. This still supports the 
notion that a strong economy may make a state an attrac-
tive interstate banking target. However, while the service 
sector may be part of what constituted a healthy economy 
in 1994, by 2014, its role is reversed. 
The above findings are in general consistent with Mor-
gan et al [26] regarding the state economy and the banking 
industry. While a healthy state economy supports a strong 
banking industry, a collapsing state economy tends to cause 
widespread bank failures [26]. Morgan et al find that under 
interstate banking, the collateral shocks are stronger than 
capital shocks. That is, while an interstate banking firm can 
supply bank capital for profitable lending from its home 
state to a host state, poor quality collaterals in the host state 
will cause the withdraw of bank capital [26]. This should 
necessarily impel the out-of-state banking firms to enter 
states with healthy economic structure since this help find 
quality lending customers with solid collateral assets. 
5.3 Banking Variables
FirmSize is significant in all equations with a positive 
sign for Outbanking and negatives sign for Inbanking. 
Clearly, larger firm sizes contribute to dominant position 
in outward interstate banking while smaller firm sizes is a 
significant factor in states’ role in inward interstate bank-
ing. This result is in line with Phillis and Pavel [28]. Here 
lies a paradox in the early days of interstate banking. As 
discussed in 5.2, many of the active outward interstate 
banking states in 1994 were small states. However, quite a 
few large and active interstate banking institution actually 
originated from these small states such as Riggs National 
Corporation in Washington D.C., First National of Ne-
braska Inc. in Nebraska, Shawmut National Corporation 
in Connecticut, U.S. Bancorp in Oregon, Zions Bancorpo-
ration in Utah, West One Bancorp in Idaho, Community 
First Bankshares Inc. in North Dakota, First Interstate 
BancSystem of Montana Inc. in Montana, Fleet Financial 
Group Inc. in Rhode Island, etc. Uneven banking legisla-
tion in early days allowed large banking firms to emerge 
and expand at the regional level, both from large and 
small states.    
HHI is significant for 2014 Inbanking equation with a 
positive sign, suggesting a more concentrated banking in-
dustry as a factor in active inward interstate banking. This 
is generally consistent with the view that the active bank-
ing consolidation leads to higher concentration at the state 
level [29,37]. This evidence by itself does not suggest rising 
local market concentration. Early study of the local mar-
ket concentration shows mixed results as a consequence 
of interstate banking [30,35]. However, more studies are 
sorely needed to assess the competitiveness effect using 
more recent data.  
ROEChange or the average of rates of return on equity 
of the banking industry in a 10 year interval is significant 
with a negative sign in the 2014 Inbanking equation, 
suggesting that a lower profitability is a reason for a state 
becoming an interstate banking destination. This is consis-
tent with Kowalik et al [21] who identify lower profitability 
as a characteristic of targets in banking merger and ac-
quisition. Lower profitability normally leads to depressed 
asset values which necessarily attract out-of-state banking 
firms to enter a bank market [11]. 
Another telling sign is KalaChange or the average cap-
ital-to-labor ratio of the state’s banking industry in a 10 
year interval. KalaChange is significant in the 2014 bank-
ing equations but with a positive sign for Outbanking and 
negative sign in Inbanking. This suggests that the banking 
industry in outward interstate banking states tended to 
have a higher capital-to-labor ratio, while it was the op-
posite in inward interstate banking states. This may be 
the result of the larger banking firms in outward interstate 
banking and smaller firms in inward interstate banking. 
Since more capital use may embody better technologies, 
this means that outward interstate banking firms tended 
to use more new technologies while the inward interstate 
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banking states use less. This is in line with Jones and 
Critchfield [16] and Berger et al [7] that banking consolida-
tion is in part a response to the use of new technologies in 
banking and larger banking institutions tend to use new 
banking technologies. This pattern is in part confirmed by 
LaborChange, the average of the percent labor expenses in 
total non-interest expenses in a 10 year interval, which is 
significant in the 2014 Inbanking equation with a positive 
sign. For the 1994 Inbanking equation, LaborChange has 
a negative sign but is only marginally significant. 
5.4 Banking Legislative Variables
Stbklaw, the composite index measuring the states’ re-
strictions on interstate banking since 1994, is significant 
in the 2014 Outbanking equation with a negative sign, 
meaning that states with less restrictive interstate banking 
regulations/laws since 1994 tended to actively establish 
interstate banking connections in other states. This finding 
is consistent with Johnson and Rice [15]. Although Stbklaw 
also has a negative sign in the 2014 Inbanking equation, it 
is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the effects of banking legislation during 
the 1980s seem to linger in the past 20 years. Bklaw is 
significant in three of the four equations. In the Inbanking 
equations, it is significant with a positive sign for both 1994 
and 2014, indicating, unsurprisingly, the positive impacts of 
states’ permissive banking legislation on inward interstate 
banking in 1994, and, surprisingly, their lingering positive 
impacts on inward interstate banking 20 years later. Both 
the regional banking compacts and the regional banking 
legislation, along with distance decay effect, aided the sig-
nificant and positive spatial lag in the Inbanking equations.   
For the Outbanking in 2014, Bklaw is significant with 
a negative sign, indicating many states with restrictive 
banking legislation during the 1980s emerged as the play-
ers in outward interstate banking in 2014.  This result is 
also in line with Johnson and Rice [15] who find banking 
firms from states with restrictive intra-state banking laws 
tended to expand in other states. Indeed, of the 15 states 
with the highest Outbanking roles, only 2, California and 
New York, have a Bklaw score in the top 10. The major 
regional Outbanking states in 2014 such as Ohio, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Alabama, and Minnesota, ranked 
24, 29, 30, 36, 40, and 45 respectively in Bklaw scores. 
These states tended to have similar Bklaw scores as their 
neighboring states but managed to emerge as major Out-
banking states. This provides support to an early argument 
in Subsection 5.1 that business strategies of banking firms 
within the states, rather than the banking legislation, 
played a significant role in states emerging as major out-
ward interstate activity. However, this effect was not clear 
in 1994 since Bklaw is not statistically significant for 
1994 Outbanking equation. This may happen due to the 
fact that there were not many states which had a strong 
positions in Outbanking in 1994.     
5.5 Interstate Banking and Macroeconomic Con-
ditions 
While the discussion so far is focused on particular 
variables or factors, the role of some of these factors in 
interstate banking cannot be detached from general mac-
roeconomic conditions.  The 1990s witnessed the highest 
growth period in the U.S. economy since the 1970s. The 
decade saw an average annual real GDP growth rate 3.4%, 
compared with 3.2% in the 1980s and 1.8% in the first 
decade of 2000s (lines in Figure 1). The economy was 
basked in rising information and globalizing economy 
[16]. There was much optimism in the U.S. economy. The 
1990s also saw the first wave of interstate banking (Figure 
1). The desire for interstate banking had been building in 
many major banking firms and the pent-up demands were 
released as the IBBEA became law [23].  Under the circum-
stance, ambitious banking firms took interstate banking as 
a new venue to discover new markets and opportunities. 
Thus interstate banking acquisitions normally were ac-
complished by paying premiums to the acquisition targets 
[16] As a result, interstate banking targets are not solely 
guided by profitability, which may explain the statistical 
insignificance of profitability in the 1994 equation. 
The economy around 2014 was much different. The 
GDP growth rates were down. The U.S. economy grew 
4.4% in 1994 but only 3% in 2014. The average annual 
real GDP growth from 1984 to 1994 was 3.5% while that 
from 2004 to 2014 was 1.9%. Many state banking indus-
tries suffered losses during the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
which contributed to lower banking profitability. Under 
such circumstances, it is understandable that in 2014 out-
ward interstate banking states are those with higher prof-
itability while inward interstate banking states are those 
with lower income levels and lower banking profitability. 
This assessment is in general agreement with Kowalik et 
al [21] who, while analyzing bank mergers between 2011 
and 2014, characterize merger targets as those small firms 
with lower profitability and lower efficiency. In addition, 
banking technologies in the 1990s were likely to be more 
uniform between larger and smaller banks they are today. 
This may explain why profitability and capital-to-labor ra-
tio were not out statistically significant in the 1994 equa-
tions, but significant in the 2014 equations.  
6. Summary and Conclusions
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This study uses a spatial 3-stage least squares model to es-
timate the interstate banking in 1994 and 2014. The method 
takes into account simultaneously spatial dependence, out-
ward and inward interstate banking and their interaction, 
and the temporal effects in interstate banking. The estima-
tion system contains four equations with outward and in-
ward interstate banking for 1994 and 2014 for the 50 states 
plus the District of Columbia. The results indicate a more 
efficient estimation than without taking these effects into 
account. These reflect in a statistically significant F test on 
the spatial effects, moderate inter-equation contemporane-
ous correlations, which results in a quarter of the parame-
ters estimates to change values by more than 10%.  
The study shows that interstate banking is driven by 
multiple factors.  A healthy economic structure, an ex-
panding market, and permissive banking legislation seem 
to encourage inward interstate banking. At the same time, 
a healthy economic structure is also a basis for strong 
banking firms to rise and to expand in other states.  Large 
banking institutions were clearly dominate in outward 
interstate banking while smaller firm sizes tend to be as-
sociated with inward interstate banking. By 2014, states 
with active inward interstate banking had not only smaller 
interstate banking institutions, but also lower capital-to-la-
bor ratios and higher labor resource use in the entire state 
banking industry. In addition, possibly for macroeconom-
ic reasons, these states also tended to have lower income 
levels and possibly resultant lower banking profitability. 
At the same time, large and well-capitalized banking firms 
from states with a healthy economic structure had expand-
ed into these states to operate bank branches and hold de-
posits. While these findings somewhat confirm the public 
impression of banking restructuring which favors the large 
and strong and disadvantages the small and weak, they do 
reveal making profits and improving efficiency through 
better technology as part of the underlying forces of spa-
tial banking consolidation.  
The study also shows evidence of continuous banking 
fragmentation. In 1994, interstate banking was clearly 
scattered in that a number of smaller states with large 
interstate banking firms began to emerge as important 
players in outward interstate banking. By 2014, while the 
nation had experienced significant banking consolidation, 
some active outward interstate banking states were from 
regions with lower levels of urbanization. Powerful bank-
ing firms from states with the highest urban development 
had not completely dominated over the nation’s banking 
landscape. The study also demonstrates that the spatial ef-
fects of past banking legislation can linger for many years. 
This indicates the significant role of public policy on con-
sumer welfare and points to the need for future banking 
regulation to carefully weigh conforming to the needs of 
business against the public interest. In this context, the 
research finds evidence of rising market concentration in 
inward interstate banking states and that major interstate 
banking firms are competing less against each other in 
their own home states. These findings necessarily raise the 
issue of competitiveness in banking markets as a result of 
interstate banking. Clearly, further study should be done 
at the local market level and necessary policy should be 
designed to insure that the bank service quality and prices 
do not come at the expense of consumers.  
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Figure 1. Annual numbers of interstate mergers and ac-
quisitions (bars) and real GDP growth rates (curve)
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Figure 2a. Percentages of deposits held across state lines 
by distance range
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Figure 2b. Percentages of bank offices held across state 
lines by distance range
Figure 2. Percentages of deposits and offices held across 
state lines by distance range
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Deposits held in other states as percent of a state’s total deposits
<1% 1-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-192%
Figure 3a. Deposits held in other states as percent of a 
state’s total deposits, 1994
Deposits held in other states as percent of a state’s total deposits
<1% 1-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-327%
Figure 3b. Deposits held in other states as percent of a 
state’s total deposits, 2014
Percent of a state’s deposits held by other states
<1% 1-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-92%
Figure 3c. Percent of a state’s deposits held by other 
states, 1994
Percent of a state’s deposits held by other states
<1% 1-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100%
Figure 3d. Percent of a state’s deposits held by other 
states, 2014
Figure 3. Percent of deposits in interstate banking
Table 1. Definitions and Descriptions of Variables used in 
Estimation
Variable Definition and description
Dependent
Outbanking
Outgoing interstate banking; deposits owned by a home 
state but located in host states as percent of the home 
state’s total deposits
Inbanking
Incoming interstate banking; deposits owned by home 
states but located in a host state as percent of the host 
state’s total deposits
Demographic and socioeconomic independent
UrbanPop Urban population as percent of a state’s total population; both years
Employees Total employments in a state; both years
PCI Per capita income; both years
LQPrimary Location quotient for primary sector; both years but use 1998 data for 1994
LQService Location quotient for service sector; both years but use 1998 data for 1994
LQMFG Location quotient for manufacturing; both years but use 1998 data for 1994
LQFIRE Location quotient for FIRE sector; both years but use 1998 data for 1994
LQGov Location quotient for government sector; both years but use 1998 data for 1994
PopChange Average annual population change rate during a 10 year interval; 1984 to 1994 for 1994, 2004 to 2014 for 2014
Banking independent
FirmSize Average size of a state’s banking firms with interstate activities; both years
PCO Number of bank offices per 1000 population in a state; both years
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; sum of squared de-
posit shares from all banking firms in a state; both years
ROEChange
Average rate of return to equity of a state’s banking in-
dustry during a 10 year interval; 1984 to 1994 for 1994, 
2004 to 2014 for 2014
KalaChange
Average capital to labor rate of a state’s banking industry 
during a 10 year interval; 1984 to 1994 for 1994, 2004 
to 2014 for 2014
LaborChange
Average percent of labor expenses in total non-interest 
expenses of a state’s banking industry during a 10 year 
interval; 1984 to 1994 for 1994, 2004 to 2014 for 2014
Banking legislative intendent
Bklaw
A composite index for state banking laws incorporating 
both intra-state branching and interstate banking laws; 
same for both years
Stbklaw A composite index for state interstate banking laws since 
1994 reflecting specific restrictions on interstate banking
Table 2. Between-equation contemporaneous correlations
Outbank-
ing2014
Inbank-
ing2014
Outbank-
ing1994
Inbank-
ing1994
Outbanking2014 1.0000 -0.0742 0.1901 0.0816
Inbanking2014 -0.0719 -0.1065
Outbanking1994 -0.2231
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Table 3. Estimates of parameters and one-tailed p-values 
(in parentheses)
Models
Outbanking14 Inbanking14 Outbanking94 Inbanking94
Intercept -11.0755 (0.3815)
44.0140 
(0.2127)
73.5375 
(0.0089)
-141.159 
(0.0016)
UrbanPop -0.63 (0.0028) 0.42 (0.055)
0.1709 
(0.0817)
Employees 0.0002 (0.0577)
-0.001 
(0.0001)
PCI -0.0003 (0.2518)
-0.0014 
(0.0051)
-0.0024 
(0.0534)
LQPrimary 6.1440 (0.0026)
2.1586 
(0.1024)
LQService -96.1698 (0.006)
56.5662 
(0.021)
LQMFG 14.0457 (0.0135)
12.0323 
(0.0317
6.5600 
(0.1267)
LQFIRE 51.8126 (0.0091)
92.1394 
(0.0007)
LQGov 31.4387 (0.0052)
33.9293 
(0.0002)
PopChange -6.8038 (0.0703)
8.0493 
(0.035)
6.496 
(0.0006)
FirmSize 0.0001 (0.0000)
-0.0001 
(0.0001)
0.0001 
(0.0000)
-0.0001 
(0.0217)
PCO
HHI 0.0109 (0.00015)
ROEChange -239.4 (0.0104)
KalaChange 77.1646 (0.0005)
-91.3939 
(0.0031)
LaborChange 81.8808 (0.012)
-45.0713 
(0.0458)
Bklaw -4.1412 (0.0017) 3.221 (0.011)
-3.1541 
(0.0569)
2.7596 
(0.0083)
Stbklaw -3.397 (0.0369)
-2.4369 
(0.0932)
ρ
0.1237 
(0.0505)
0.3525 
(0.0174)
-0.0352 
(0.4442)
0.3520 
(0.0121)
λ -0.1847 -0.1553 -0.0583 -0.2991
Weighted R2 0.82
Note: Parameters used in estimation are selected through a stepwise pro-
cess. Only selected variables are presented in the table.  
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